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EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, PAROL EVIDENCE, AND 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: A CALL FOR 
COURTS TO USE THE REASONING OF THE 
RESTATEMENTS RATHER THAN THE 
RHETORIC OF COMMON LAW 
David G. Epstein,* Timothy Archer,** and Shalayne Davis*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the first year of law school, law students, lawyers, and judges 
encounter the terms "parol evidence," 1 "parol evidence rule," and "ex-
* George E. Allen Chair, University of Richmond. As the senior author, let me 
make two ministerial points. First, my name appears first because I am a law 
professor, and putting my name first is the kind of arbitrary, egotistical thing that law 
professors do. Second, Tim and Shalayne's names appear as authors, even though 
they are law students, because they spent virtually all summer working on this article. 
In light of the quality and quantity of their work, my simply acknowledging their 
contribution to this article in a footnote would be a really "tacky" thing to do, even 
for a law professor. 
** Law student, University of Richmond Law School. 
*** Law student, University of Richmond Law School. 
l. In some states, they will also encounter the term "parole evidence." E.g., 
Robledo-Soto v. United States, No. 1:11-cr-00328-LJO, 2012 WL 5396395, at *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) ("[C]ourts apply contract principles, including the parole evidence 
rule"); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) ("Simply 
stated, the [parole evidence] rule operates ... to exclude evidence of prior or contem-
poraneous conversations, representations, or statements." (citing Hall v. Process In-
struments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995))). New Mexico courts also 
utilize the term "parole." E.g., Diversified Development & Inv., Inc. v. Heil, 1995-
NMSC-005, 'lI 36, 119 N.M. 290, 889 P.2d 1212 ("this Court held that parole evidence 
was not admissible"). Some courts use the terms "parol evidence" and "parole evi-
dence" interchangeably. E.g., Bettis v. Hall, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334 (D. Kan. 2012) 
("Where a contract is complete and unambiguous on its face, the court must deter-
mine the parties' intent from the four corners of the document, without regard to 
extrinsic or parole evidence. Even if the parties' interpretations of the contract differ, 
the Court need not resort to parol evidence to interpret the contract meaning if the 
contract is complete and unambiguous." (footnotes omitted)); Miller v. Reminger 
Co., L.P.A., No. 3:11-cv-315-CRS, 2012 WL 2050239, at *11 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2012) 
("The overarching principle suggested in Rivermont Inn, Inc. applies just as clearly to 
the common law parol evidence rule as it does to the statute of frauds. Kentucky 
views the parole evidence rule as a firm and well-established rule of law." (citing 
Rivermont Inn, Inc., v. Bass Hotel Resorts, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 636 (Ky. App. 2003)); cf 
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trinsic evidence." They use and misuse these terms. For example, consider 
the following questions: can parol evidence be distinguished from extrin-
sic evidence? Do courts distinguish between parol evidence and extrinsic 
evidence when they examine questions related to the terms of a written 
contract? Should courts distinguish between parol evidence and extrinsic 
evidence when they examine questions related to the terms of a written 
contract? Does the parol evidence rule apply to both parol evidence and 
extrinsic evidence? Does the parol evidence rule govern the terms can be 
added to a written contract? Does the rule apply when interpreting the 
meaning of the terms in a written contract? More generally, to what ex-
tent should the trier of fact prefer the final written version of the deal 
over evidence of the parties' prior discussions, or evidence of common 
understanding? What is more important-rigid rules that provide cer-
tainty, or more "liberal" rules that provide justice?2 
To put these abstract questions into a practice context, consider 
these hypothetical problems. Assume that Archer Building, Inc. ("AB") 
enters into a written contract with Davis Janitorial Services Corp ("DJ") 
to provide janitorial service on a daily basis for US$800 a month, paid by 
the twentieth of each month. 
Problem 1: AB and DJ disagree as to what time DJ can begin its 
work. Their final written contract, while lengthy, does not ex-
pressly address this question. In answering this question of start- · 
ing time, will/should the court consider AB's testimony that prior 
to executing the contract, AB and DJ had agreed that AB could 
not begin work until after 10 p.m.? What about DJ's evidence that 
starting janitorial work at 8 a.m. is a well-known trade custom? 
In addition, consider this problem: 
Problem 2: AB and DJ disagree as to the meaning of the word 
"daily" in their final written contract. AB contends that daily 
means "every day" and has pre-contract e-mails that support this 
contention. DJ relies on trade usage to support its position that 
Scott J. Burnham, The Paro/ Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. 
L. REv. 93, 97 n.17 (1994) (suggesting that, while both terms are used, it is erroneous 
to use the term "parole"). 
2. It can be argued that rigid rules provide a just result: "Strict rules satisfy those 
who feel that, if you learn the rules and follow them, you should be assured that they 
will be applied firmly and without exception, even if this produces a result that ap-
pears unfair in the short run. According to this view, fairness is whatever result the 
rules produce, because in the long run predictability and invariance usually make for 
just results." Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Paro/ 
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 799, 804 (2002). 
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"daily" means business days, i.e., Monday through Friday. Again, 
will a court consider AB's evidence? or DJ's evidence? Should a 
court consider the evidence? Should a court distinguish between 
AB's evidence and DJ's evidence? 
51 
In both problems, we assume that there is a final written contract. This is 
often a hotly contested issue.3 (To assume what is often a hotly contested 
issue is one of the wonderful luxuri~s of law school and law review arti-
cles in particular.) Problem 1 involves contract supplementation. AB and 
DJ are asking the court to add a time of performance term to their final 
written contract. Problem 2 involves contract interpretation.4 AB and DJ 
are asking the court to give meaning to the term "daily" in their written 
contract. 
A third problem could arise in practice. While we are mindful of the 
popularity, power, and simplicity of the "rule of three" in rhetoric,5 story-
telling,6 and speaking,7 we resisted the temptation to include a third prob-
lem involving contract contradiction. Consider for example, a problem in 
which the written contract provides for a monthly payment of US$800. 
3. See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
70-93 (2009) (illustrating the numerous difficulties that arise in establishing existence 
of a written contract). 
4. "Interpretation" was distinguished from "construction" by F. Lieber, the 19th 
century hermeneutics scholar (who should be distinguished from F. Leiber, the 20th 
century science fiction writer). According to Lieber, "[i]nterpretation is the art of 
finding out [with respect to words] ... the sense which their author intended to con-
vey." FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 23, 55 (Roy M. Mer-
sky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., WM S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1970) (1889). In contrast, 
"[c]onstruction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the 
direct expression of the text." Id. at 56. 
5. See WHAT Is A TRICOLON, http://www.speaklikeapro.co.uk/What_is_tricolon. 
htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (emphasis removed) ("A Tricolon (sometimes called 
the 'Rule of Threes') is really more of a general principle than a rhetorical technique, 
but it is very effective. For some reason, the human brain seems to absorb and re-
member information more effectively when it is presented in threes ... [for example,] 
'[v]eni, vidi, vici' ... Julius Ceasar [or] ... 'The few, the proud, the Marines'-adver-
tising slogan, United States Marine Corps"). 
6. E.g., Silly Symphony: The Three Little Pigs, YouTuBE (Jan. 20. 2013), http:// 
www.youtube. com/watch?v=Olo923T2HQ4; Goldilocks and the Three Bears, You-
TuBE (Jan. 20. 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63w9aPO-W_E; Rachel 
Kramer Bussel, '50 Shades of Grey' Is the Subject of a Course at American University, 
THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/28/ 
50-shades-of-grey-is-the-subject-of-a-course-at-american-university.html .. 
7. See Richard Nordquist, What Is Barack Obama's Secret for Giving a Great 
Speech? How to Inspire an Audience With the Magic Number Three, ABOUT.COM, 
http://grammar.about.com/od/essaysonstyle/a/Barack-Obamas-Victory-Speech-And-
The-Magic-Number-Three.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
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AB argues that they had agreed earlier that the payment would be 
US$5,000 a year, and DJ argues that the trade custom calls for weekly 
payments.8 Unlike Problem 1 and Problem 2, there is neither precedent 
nor policy to support AB and DJ in their efforts to contradict an express 
term in a final written contract.9 
As should be clear from our two practice context problems, this arti-
cle is an example of what Professor Richard Epstein10 would call "Con-
tracts small." According to Professor Richard Epstein, "'Contracts small' 
relates to contract law at the doctrinal level; it focuses on the rules of 
contract formation and performance; the everyday 'stuff of lawyer's 
law.' " 11 
This article looks to the Restatement of Contracts (hereafter "Re-
statement") and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (hereafter "Re-
statement Second") for answers to the questions raised by the two 
problems. The Restatements generally have both been praised and con-
demned for their focus on doctrinal issues-on what Richard Epstein 
8. There are of course situations where it is less clear whether trade custom is 
being argued to contradict an express term in a final, written contract (like our Prob-
lem 3) or to interpret an express term in a final written contract (like our Problem 2). 
For example, in Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., Inc., 16 P.2d 627, 628-31 (Or. 1932), the 
contract for a sale of horsemeat scraps expressly required that the scraps be greater 
than 50% protein. The scraps delivered were more than 49.5% protein but less than 
50%. The court held that greater than 50% protein could be interpreted as greater 
than 49.5% because of trade usage. Interpretation or contradiction? 
9. But cf David W. McLauchlan, The Inconsistent Collateral Contract, 3 DAL-
HOUSIE L.J. 136, 162 (1976-77) ("The object of this article has been to suggest that 
inconsistency ought not to operate as a bar to the enforcement of an oral agreement 
as a collateral contract where the making of the oral agreement has been proved to 
the court's satisfaction. However, it must be conceded that the long line of authorities 
to the contrary means that the courts will probably not feel free to accept this 
suggestion."). 
10. Professor Richard Epstein is not related biologically or intellectually to the 
senior author of this article. 
11. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law 
Through the Law of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND R1sE OF FREEDOM OF CoN-
TRAcrS 25, 26 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). Others have already written the "Contracts 
large" articles on the parol evidence rule-articles that explore the broader questions 
of political theory, such as the proper role of the state in regulating private agree-
ments. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 
88 CALIF. L. REv. 1743, 1756 et seq. (2000); Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 958 et seq. (2010). Additionally, 
others have written on interdisciplinary questions such as the gender bias history of 
the parol evidence rule. See Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reap-
praisal of the Paro/ Evidence Rule With Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. 
PoL'v & L. 251 (2005). 
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calls the "everyday stuff of lawyer's law."12 As indicated earlier, the "eve-
ryday stuff of lawyer's law" includes the terms "extrinsic evidence," "pa-
rol evidence,'' and "parol evidence rule."13 Let's start by choosing some 
working definitions. 
II. DEFINITIONS OF "EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE,'' "PAROL 
EVIDENCE,'' AND THE "PAROL EVIDENCE RULE" 
A. Oxford English Dictionary 
The United States Supreme Court regularly looks to the Oxford En-
glish Dictionary. 14 The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following 
definition for "parol" as an adjective: "Expressed or given orally; verbal, 
oral. Now only in Law; in such phrases as parol evidence as distinguished 
from documentary evidence." 15 
B. French Dictionary 
The words "parol" and "parole" have a common origin in the old 
French and "Law-French"16 word "parol."17 Prisoners on parole have 
given their word that they will not again commit crimes. 18 In French, the 
word "parol" has become "parole." An online French-to-English diction-
12. See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements 
and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REv. 205 (2007) (discussing common criticisms of 
the American Law Institute and the Restatement movement). 
13. But cf Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Cen-
tered Paro/ Evidence Rule, 68 U. C1N. L. REv. 269, 271 n.5 (2000) ("Based on the 
author's experience as editor of CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, moreover, approximately 
30% of the reported contracts opinions in the past several years have involved issues 
arising under the parol evidence rule."). 
14. E.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2170 (2012); 
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2034, 2042 n.6 (2012). 
15. XI THE OxFORD ENGLISH D1cr10NARY 248 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis 
omitted). 
16. For a discussion of the role of Law-French in the development of law, see 
PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 28-36 (1999). 
17. Crooks v. Sanders, 115 S.E. 760, 762 (S.C. 1922) ("The English word 'parole' 
is a shortened form of the French parole d'honneur (word of honor), the derivation of 
which the lexicographers trace to the late Latin parabola and the Greek TT)'PYl3wt.11 
story, parable, adopted into English as 'parol,' i.e., verbal, oral, word of mouth, as 
now used in the legal term 'parol evidence.'"). 
18. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of Fail-
ing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 low A L. REv. 491, 497-98 (2008). 
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ary uses the terms "word" and "speech" in its various English definitions 
of the French word "parole."19 
C. Law Dictionaries 
According to a 19th century law dictionary: "Parol, or more prop-
erly parole, (says Bouvier) is a French word, which means literally word 
or speech."20 The leading 21st century law dictionary, Black's Law Dic-
tionary,21 defines "parol evidence" as "[e]vidence of oral statements"22 
and defines "extrinsic evidence" as "[ e ]vidence relating to a contract but 
not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other 
sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances sur-
rounding the agreement."23 This language supports the conclusions that 
(1) parol evidence is a form of extrinsic evidence, and (2) parol evidence 
is not the only form of extrinsic evidence, since extrinsic evidence in-
cludes the circumstances surrounding the agreement.24 
There is, however, additional, relevant language in Black's defini-
tion of extrinsic evidence and parol evidence. The definition of extrinsic 
evidence continues to say "[a]lso termed extraneous evidence, parol evi-
dence, evidence aliunde," and the definition of parol evidence goes on to 
say "[s]ee extrinsic evidence."25 
19. Paro/ translation English: French Dictionary, REVERSO.NET, http://dictionary. 
reverso.net/french-english/parol (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
20. Yarborough v. West, 10 Ga. 471, 473 (1851) (quoting 2 Bouvier's Law Diction-
ary 262 (3d ed. 1851) ). 
21. Sarah Yates, Black's Law Dictionary: The Making of an American Standard, 
103 LAW LmR. J. 175, 181 (2011) ("Black further described the intended scope of the 
dictionary in his preface: 'The dictionary now offered to the profession is the result of 
the author's endeavor to prepare a concise and yet comprehensive book of definitions 
of the terms, phrases, and maxims used in American and English law and necessary to 
be understood by the working lawyer and judge .... "'). 
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (9th ed. 2009). 
23. Id. at 637. 
24. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (3d ed. 1933) (Providing similar 
support for this conclusion can be found in the third edition that was published 
roughly contemporaneously with the Restatement. The third edition does not use the 
term "extrinsic evidence" but defines "evidence aliunde" as "[e]vidence from outside, 
from another source. In certain cases a written instrument can be explained by evi-
dence aliunde, that is, by evidence drawn from sources exterior to the instrument 
itself. e.g., the testimony of a witness to conversations, admissions, or preliminary 
negotiations."). 
25. See generally id. (showing, again, that there is similar language in the earlier 
3d edition of Black's which concludes its definition of "parol evidence" with the state-
ment "[i]n a particular sense, and with reference to contracts ... parol evidence is the 
same as extraneous evidence or evidence aliunde."). 
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D. This Article's Definitions 
1. "Parol evidence" and "extrinsic evidence" 
In this article, we will use the term "parol evidence" to refer to pre-
contract words of one or both of the parties. These words could be spo-
ken or written. Even though the dictionaries' definitions limit "parol" to 
oral statements, courts and commentators consistently apply the term 
"parol evidence" to both written and oral statements.26 So will we in this 
article. We will use the term "extrinsic evidence," and not the term "parol 
evidence" to refer to usage, to any other evidence outside the writing, 
and to evidence other than the words of the parties. There is a bit of 
Lewis Carroll in this approach.27 We understand that words of the parties 
spoken or written before they enter into a written agreement are actually 
extrinsic to that written agreement, i.e., they could be viewed as extrinsic 
evidence. 
In applying the parol evidence rule, there is ample case support for 
limiting the term "parol evidence" to words of the parties. Consider the 
following statements from federal district courts: "The parol evidence 
rule, however, only governs admissibility of prior agreements and negoti-
ations, not other forms of extrinsic evidence";28 "[t]he parol evidence rule 
bars the introduction of the most questionable form of extrinsic evi-
dence-self-serving testimony by one of the parties as to what the parties 
'really' agreed to in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the 
contract. "29 
26. See Nat'I Blvd. Bank of Chicago v. Corydon Travel Bureau, Inc., 238 N.E. 2d 
81, 86 (111. App. Ct. 1968) ("[O]ral and written evidence which limited his guaranty 
.... Such parol evidence .... "); Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. CMS Mktg. Servs. & Trading 
Co., No. 2-03-251-CV, 2005 WL 182951, at *5 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2005) ("oral or 
written parol evidence"). See also Juanda Lowder Daniel, K.l.S.S. The Paro/ Evidence 
Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of Protecting the Parties' Written Agreement, 
57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 235 (2007) ("[T]he word 'parol' means by word of mouth 
[citing to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary] as opposed to in written form. However, 
from early on, the parol evidence rule has been applied to exclude both oral and 
written matters occurring prior to creation of the written agreement."). 
27. See LEWIS CARROLL, AucE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS 254 (Alfred A. Knoph) (1872) ("When I use a word, it means just what I 
choose it to mean-neither more nor less."); Parker B. Potter, Jr., Wondering About 
Alice: Judicial References to Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, 28 
WHITTIER L. REv. 175, 176 n.6 (2006). 
28. Klosek v. Am. Express Co., No. 08-426, 2008 WL 4057534, at *13 n.9 (D. 
Minn., Aug. 26, 2008). 
29. Hoover v. ABF Freight System, Inc., No. 06-1301, 2008 WL 1805392, at *8 
(C.D. Ill., Apr. 18, 2008) (quoting Regency Commercial Associates, LLC v. Lopax, 
Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 327 (111. App. Ct. 2007), quoting Judge Richard Posner, The Law 
and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1581, 1600 (2005)). 
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2. Conflation 
Courts sometimes "conflate"30 the terms parol evidence and extrin-
sic evidence.31 Consider this statement from one opinion: "The parol evi-
dence rule bars extrinsic evidence of prior negotiations offered to 
contradict or supplement a written contract."32 In another opinion, the 
court said, "since the liberalization of California's parol evidence rule, 
parol evidence of custom and usage is admissible to interpret the meaning 
of written words."33 For the purposes of this article, we define "evidence 
of prior negotiations" as parol evidence, and "evidence of custom" as ex-
trinsic evidence, and not parol evidence. 
3. Paro! evidence rule and parol agreements 
Let's now establish a working definition of the phrase "parol evi-
dence rule." Law review discussions of the parol evidence rule often34 
begin with the following quotation from a nineteenth century evidence 
treatise: "Few things are darker than this [the parol evidence rule], or 
fuller of subtle difficulties. "35 
"In part, the parol evidence rule is so 'dark and difficult' ... because 
... there exists even today no definitive statement of the [parol evidence] 
30. See generally Margaret Kniffin, Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpreta-
tion and the Paro/ Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone Else's Clothes?, 
62 RUTGERS L. REv. 75 (2009) (providing background and meaning for the word 
"conflate" which we decided to use after a December 12, 2012 Westlaw search of the 
JLR data produced 7,189 hits for the word "conflate" and a Westlaw search of the 
Yale Law Journal database produced 113 hits). 
31. Compare Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., 393 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 
2004) (using the phrase "parol (i.e. extrinsic evidence)"), with Bohier-Udderholm 
Am., Inc. v. Elwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (using the phrase 
"extrinsic evidence, i.e., parol evidence"). See also Addicks Servs. Inc. v. GGP-
Bridgeland Lp., 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (using the phrase, "course of per-
formance"-i.e., what the contracting parties have done post-contract-as a form of 
"parol evidence"). 
32. Hofeldt v. Mehling, 658 N.W.2d 783, 787 (S.D. 2003). See C.R. Anthony Co. v. 
Loretto Mall Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, 'lI 16, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 ("parol 
evidence rule ... bars admission of extrinsic evidence"). 
33. Buchanan v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 177 F.Supp.2d 1005, 
1008-1009 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
34. Charles, L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1310 n.457 (1998) ("obligatory"). 
35. JAMES 8. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
MON LAW 390 (1898). See Clark v. Sideris, 1982-NMSC-151, 'lI 11, 99 N.M. 209, 656 
P.2d 872 ("The parol evidence rule is a source of considerable confusion."). 
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rule."36 The differences among the statements of the parol evidence are 
often substantive. Carefully reread the two quoted excerpts from court 
opinions that were reproduced in the last paragraph of Part II.D.l in this 
article. Notice that the two statements differ not only as to what evidence 
is affected by the parol evidence rule, but also as to what questions are 
governed by the parol evidence rule. 
The first quoted excerpt uses the term "parol evidence rule" to ex-
amine whether terms can be added to an agreement that has been re-
duced to writing-like our Problem 1 in which adding a time of 
performance term to the written janitorial services contract is to be ex-
amined. The second quoted excerpt applies the parol evidence rule to a 
question of interpreting a term in a written contract-as in our Problem 
2, in which interpreting the term "daily" in the written janitorial services 
contract is to be examined. 
Courts and commentators agree that the parol evidence rule applies 
to questions of whether terms can be added to an agreement that has 
been reduced to writing. As Professor Steven Burton writes: 
The most widely endorsed version of the common law parol evi-
dence rule may be stated in two parts as follows, synthesizing the 
authorities read for this study: (1) Where an enforceable, written 
agreement is the final and complete expression of the parties' 
agreement, prior oral and written agreements and contemporane-
ous oral agreements (together 'parol agreements') ... do not es-
tablish contract terms when the parol agreement contradicts or 
adds to the terms of the writing; (2) in addition, when an enforcea-
ble, written agreement is the final, but not the complete, expres-
sion of the parties' agreement, a parol agreement may add to, but 
may not contradict, the written terms. This doctrinal statement, as 
far as it goes, is a matter of wide consensus.37 
For purposes of this article, we will use Professor Burton's doctrinal state-
ment as the parol evidence rule. Note in particular, Professor Burton's 
use of the phrase "oral and written." 
The first case that applied the parol evidence rule involved oral tes-
timony. Scholars38 trace the parol evidence rule's origins back to The 
36. Ralph James Mooney, A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme Court: Let's 
Try Again on the Paro/ Evidence Rule, 84 OR. L. REv. 369, 372 (2005). See also 
Linzer, supra note 2, at 807 ("So, instead of a parol evidence 'rule,' there is a contin-
uum of many different approaches, all using the same name and often the same 
words."). 
37. BuRTON, supra note 3, at 64 (emphasis added). 
38. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 11, at 259; Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Con-
tract as a Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 87, 91 n.7 (2001). 
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Countess of Rutland's Case.39 The case concerned a transfer of land.40 Ed-
ward Earl of Rutland, willed his property, Eykering, to his wife, the 
Countess, and by a later, second document to "heirs males of the body of 
the said Thomas Earl of Rutland," his father. 41 By these contradictory 
documents, Edward's nephew, Roger, stood to take Eykering, because he 
had been granted the property the day after the will was executed. The 
Countess wanted to use the oral testimony of trustees to prove that Ed-
ward really meant to give the property to her at his death. In ruling for 
Roger, the court relied in part on a rationale that can be read as limiting 
the parol evidence rule to alleged oral agreements: "[I]t would be incon-
venient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and 
which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties 
should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the un-
certain testimony of slippery memory."42 
According to Professor Farnsworth, this language is no longer the 
important language from the case: "Now the conceit that the parol evi-
dence rule is rooted in the relative unreliability of testimony based on 
'slippery memory' in contrast with the 'tertain truth' afforded by a writ-
ing has fallen from favor."43 And, there is other language in Countess of 
Rutland that supports Professor Farnsworth's "conceit": "If other agree-
ments or limitation of uses be made by writing or by other matter as high 
or higher, then the last agreement shall stand; for every contract or agree-
ment ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first 
deed."44 Since this Countess of Rutland language extends the parol evi-
dence rule to prior written agreements, it must have a policy base other 
than concern about the "uncertain testimony of slippery memory." 
Professor Marvin Chirelstein agrees with Farnsworth's conceit: 
The purpose of the rule is apparent.45 Since the completion and 
execution of a written contract is typically the concluding point in 
39. The Countess of Rutland's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B.). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
43. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcrs § 7.2, at 213 (2d ed 
1998). But cf Mark 0. Morris & Elizabeth Evensen, What's Happening co the Paro/ 
Evidence Rule? More Holes in the Dike, 67 DEF. CouNs. J. 209, 219 (2000) ("The 
policy behind the parol evidence rule is 'to give the writing a preferred status so as to 
render it immune to perjured testimony and the risk of uncertain testimony of slip-
pery memory."' (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
44. Countess of Rutland, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90. 
45. But cf Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 745 ("Why this 
[the parol evidence rule) should be so is one of the common law's enduring puzzles."). 
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the bargaining process, one's ordinary expectation is that the doc-
ument itself will contain all the conscious and important elements 
of the deal. ... The parol evidence rule assumes that the formal 
writing reflects the parties' minds at a point of maximum resolu-
tion and, hence, that duties and restrictions that do not appear in 
the written document, even though apparently accepted an earlier 
stage, were not intended by the parties to survive.46 
59 
Notice also that Professor Burton uses the phrase "parol agreements" in-
stead of Professor Chirelstein's phrase "duties and restrictions," or the 
more widely used term "parol evidence." Professor Burton explains: "Pa-
rol agreements should be distinguished from parol evidence; the latter 
may not amount to an agreement and therefore would not bind either 
party. The parol evidence rule applies to render parol agreements inoper-
ative when they are offered to establish contract terms."47 
Thus, we have a "parol evidence" rule that is (1) not limited to "pa-
rol" insofar as that originally meant "oral," but (2) is limited to "parol 
·agreements" and not to other words of one or both of the parties, and (3) 
is further limited to questions of whether parol agreements can add terms 
to a written contract. In sum, questions on whether parol evidence can be 
used to interpret terms in a written contract are outside the purview of 
the parol evidence rule. 
Courts do not necessarily embrace Professor Burton's parol evi-
dence rule. As noted earlier, some courts go further than Professor Bur-
ton, and invoke the term "parol evidence rule" when deciding whether to 
consider parol evidence and extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning 
of a term in a written contract. The use of the parol evidence rule has 
been widely (but not uniformly) criticized by law professors48 and by the 
courts. According to Lee v. Flintkote Co.,49 "[s]trictly speaking, the parol 
evidence rule does not bar extra-contractual evidence of meanings as-
signed to the terms of an agreement; that is the function of the plain 
meaning rule which prohibits consideration of extrinsic evidence of intent 
46. MARVIN A. CHiRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 98 (5th ed. 2006) (emphasis added). 
47. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 67. 
48. Compare Kniffin, supra note 30, at 81-90 section B entitled "The Scholars 
Who Have Discerned the Difference," with Eric Posner, The Paro[ Evidence Rule, the 
Plain Meaning Rule and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. 
REv. 533, 534 (1998) ("Most courts would subscribe to something close to the follow-
ing statement of the parol evidence rule: A court will refuse to use evidence of the 
parties' prior negotiations in order to interpret a written contract unless the writing is 
(1) incomplete, (2) ambiguous or (3) the product of fraud, mistake, or a similar bar-
gaining defect."). 
49. Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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when the contract is unequivocal."50 Similarly, Burlison v. United States51 
tells us: 
More recently, academic authority has recognized that although 
courts often conflate the parol-evidence rule with the plain-mean-
ing rule, '[a] clear conceptual division would treat the plain mean-
ing rule as about interpreting the provisions of contracts, and the 
parol evidence rule as about establishing what count[s] as the con-
trolling terms of integrated contracts.'52 
In this article, we will use the term "plain meaning rule" and not the term 
"parol evidence rule" in addressing questions on the meaning of a word 
in a written contract.53 We will address questions about whether courts 
should look to parol evidence in determining whether the meaning of a 
written term is "plain" and suggest that courts look to policy rather than 
the parol evidence rule to resolve these questions. Further, we will ad-
dress the uncertainty in the law caused in part by the courts' differing 
uses of terminology.54 With this background, we will now apply the Re-
50. Id. at 1281. 
51. Burlison v. United States, 533 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009). 
52. Id. at 430 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: 
Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 533, 587 (2005)). See also Arthur L. 
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Paro/ Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 
161 (1965); Kniffin, supra note 30, at 75. But see BRIAN H. B1x, CONTRACT LAw: 
RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT 59 (2012) ("The parol evidence rule deals with the 
admission of other ('extrinsic') evidence to help in the interpretation of a written 
document."); Linzer, supra note 2, at 801 ("the parol evidence rule and the plain 
meaning rule are conjoined like Siamese twins"); Posner, supra note 48, at 534 n.1 
("Because both the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule concern the same 
issue-under what circumstances extrinsic evidence can be used to supplement a writ-
ing-they are best analyzed together."). 
53. See BuRTON, supra note 3, at 109 ("The most widely adopted statements of 
the plain meaning rule say that '[a]n unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning."'); see also Linzer, supra note 2, at 803 ("In its most rigid form, the plain 
meaning rule bars extrinsic evidence unless the word is ambiguous on its face. The 
flaw in plain meaning is, of course, the notion of a latent ambiguity."). 
54. We will address the question of whether courts should use either the "parol 
evidence rule" or the "plain meaning rule" or neither the "parol evidence rule" nor 
the "plain meaning rule" in resolving questions as to what a term in a written agree-
ments means. But cf Linzer, supra note 2, at 838-39 ("Formalism of the kind found in 
plain meaning and an 'objectivist' parol evidence rule is much easier to carry out than 
weighing context, credibility, linguistic sensibility, and the many other factors that can 
go into an interpretation of words that may or may not mean what we think they 
mean. It is comforting to live in a world of plain meaning. But that world just isn't 
real."). 
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statement and the Restatement Second to the questions raised by our two 
problems. 
III. REST ATEMENT55 
Uncertainty as to the governing law, generally caused by different 
outcomes in cases, drove the Restatement movement.56 The Restatement 
was the first work product of the American Law Institute (ALI). The 
ALI was incorporated in 1923. According to the statement of purpose in 
the ALI's certificate of incorporation: "The particular business and ob-
jects of the society are educational, and are to promote the clarification 
and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to 
secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on 
scholarly and scientific legal work."57 People who attended the first meet-
ing of the ALI were told that achieving the purposes described in the 
ALI's certificate of incorporation would be impossible unless the existing 
law could be first established with some degree of certainty, and that the 
two causes of uncertainty were (1) "lack of agreement among lawyers 
concerning the fundamental principles of the common law" and (2) "the 
lack of precision in the use of legal terms."58 They were also told that the 
ALI should create a "Restatement of the Law" to cure (1) and (2).59 
The first such Restatement, the Restatement of Contracts, was com-
pleted nine years later. Each Restatement was the result of the work of a 
Reporter, an exceptional scholar in the field; a committee of Advisors; 
and a Council to supervise and provide recommendations on the work of 
the Reporter and his Advisors. Tentative drafts were prepared and sub-
mitted to all ALI members well in advance of the ALI annual meetings. 
55. Some reported decisions still make use of the Restatement First provisions 
relating to parol evidence and extrinsic evidence. E.g., In re E. Airport Dev., LLC, 
443 B.R. 823, 829 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011 ); Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal "Z" ENA, Inc., 598 A.2d 
1234, 1236 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
56. Proceedings of 1923 Annual Meeting, 1 A.LI. PROC. 14 (1923). E.g., Edward 
White, The American Law Institute and The Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 
LAw & H1sT. REv. 1, 2 (1997) ("[T]he starting point of the ALI project, [began with] 
its founders' conclusions that the American legal system was suffering from its in-
creased 'uncertainty."' (alteration added)); see also Robert W. Stayton & Marian 0. 
Boner, The Plastic Code in Operation: II, 36 TEX. L. REv. 733, 734-35 (1958). See 
generally John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
615 (1998). 
57. See Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at its Future, 12 
GREEN BAG 2o 255, 256 (2009). 
58. Frank, supra note 56, at 615-17. 
59. Id. 
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"The goal was to have each Restatement represent the considered legal 
judgment, not merely of the Reporter, nor even of his Advisers, but of 
the profession throughout the country."60 
Whether the Restatement of Contracts represents the "considered 
legal judgment ... of the profession throughout the country" has been 
questioned. Professor Samuel Williston,61 author of the leading Contracts 
treatise, was the Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. According 
to Professor Arthur Corbin,62 
[Williston] was older than the advisers (13 [years] older than I) 
and he had published much more. Also, he had had large contacts 
with bench and bar, and 'he had a way with him.' He asked his 
advisers (if they would) to go through his treatise and point out 
spots needing correction or amendment. Nobody did this but me 
.... Williston was hard to move from a position (justly so) .... 63 
Professor Alan Milner, a Fellow at Trinity College, Oxford, made the 
same point more bluntly "Williston's Restatement of Contracts is only Wil-
liston on Contracts under a new name and reduced in size .... "64 The 
"reduced size" product consisted of two volumes. It was more than 1,200 
pages long, and included 609 sections of black letter law, with comments 
and illustrations that accompanied most sections, but contained no cita-
tions.65 The 609 sections were divided into chapters which were further 
subdivided into topics. Chapter 9 was entitled "The Scope and Meaning 
of Contracts," and that chapter was subdivided into three topics: "Topic 
1. Interpretation," "Topic 2. Parol Evidence Rule," and "Topic 3. Usage." 
Note that the Restatement treated "Contract Interpretation" and "The 
60. Id. at 620. 
61. See Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 207 
(2005) (an intellectual history); SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAw: AN AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY (1940) (personal history). 
62. Professor Corbin was one of the eight selected advisers to Samuel Williston. 
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, at ix, x (1932). Corbin later stated that 
Williston "chose me as his chief critic and adviser." Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel Willis-
ton, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1963). 
63. Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755, 768-69 (1993). 
64. Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 795, 798 (1959). See also Frank, supra note 56, at 621 ("[R]eporters like Willis-
ton ... were essentially codifying the treatises with the Restatements .... "). 
65. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 397, 402-403. (1933) ("The text is most abstract in character; the comment 
explains, qualifies, and justifies in general terms; the illustrations have the same con-
creteness as law school examination questions, the latter being usually much more 
complex and difficult."). 
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Parol Evidence Rule" as separate topics. So did the edition of Williston's 
Contracts treatise published shortly after the Restatement. Professor 
Herbert Wechsler,66 Director of the ALI, described the relationship be-
tween the Restatement and Williston's treatise as follows: "[V]ouching, as 
it were in his famous treatise, as warranty for the positions that the Insti-
tute espoused."67 
Let's now examine the Restatement's (and Williston's Contract 
treatise's) "The Parol Evidence Rule" using our two Problems.68 
A. Paro/ Evidence and Contract Supplementation 
In Problem 1, AB's testimony that AB and DJ had agreed on a 
starting time is parol evidence. No section in the Restatement topic enti-
tled "The Parol Evidence Rule" uses the term "parol evidence rule" or 
even parol evidence in the text. Section 237, the first of eight sections in 
Topic 2, "Parol Evidence Rule," is the only section with "Parol Evidence 
Rule" in its title,69 and is generally referred to as the Restatement's parol 
evidence rule.70 The other sections in Topic 2 can be treated as qualifica-
tions or exceptions to the parol evidence rule. The words in Section 237 
are consistent with the words of the first part of Professor Steven Bur-
ton's "most widely endorsed version of the parol evidence rule. "71 Section 
237 provides: 
Except as stated in §§ 240, 241 the integration of an agreement 
makes inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contem-
poraneous oral agreements relating to the same subject matter; 
and also, unless the integration is void, or voidable and avoided, 
all prior oral or written agreements relating thereto. If either void 
66. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 
CoLuM. L. REv. 1359 (2000). 
67. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, at vii (Tentative Draft 
Nos. 1-7, 1973). 
68. See generally John H. Wigmore, A Brief History of the Paro[ Evidence Rule, 4 
CoLuM. L. REV. 338, 338-39 (1904) (explaining that the Paro! Evidence Rule did not 
originate in the Restatement. Its origins are generally traced to the Middle Ages and 
the superior evidentiary value of sealed documents). 
69. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932) (showing the other 
sections in Topic 2 can be treated as qualifications or exceptions). 
70. See Rodriguez v. Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, 276 F.2d 344, 349 
n.2 (1st Cir. 1960) ("1 Restatement, Contracts § 237, Com. (b) (1932), ... where the 
parol evidence rule is set forth .... "); Arman v. Structiform Engineering Co., Inc., 24 
N.W.2d 723, 727 (1946) ("In Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 237, p. 331, the 
parol evidence rule .... "). 
71. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
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or voidable and avoided, the integration leaves the operation of 
prior agreements unaffected. 
Section 237 contains the phrase "integration of an agreement" that re-
quires reference back to Section 228 which defines integration.72 In a con-
tracts context, integration means (1) in written agreement between two 
people that is (2) "a final statement of their intentions as to the matters 
contained therein."73 The Restatement's Section 237 phrase "makes inop-
erative to add" would seem to be a blanket prohibition on a court's deci-
sion to look to parol evidence in contract supplementation problems like 
our Problem 1. Section 237, however, should be read together with Sec-
tions 239-40. 
Section 239 provides in pertinent part, "Effect of Partial Integration. 
Where there is integration of part of the terms of a contract[,] prior writ-
ten agreements and contemporaneous oral agreements are operative to 
vary these terms only to the same extent as if the whole contract had 
been integrated." (emphasis added). Section 239, and in particular, the 
words "to vary," should be read carefully. What is important are the 
words that are not in Section 239-the words "to add." Under Section 
239, a partial integration makes "inoperative" parol agreements that 
"vary" it does not expressly make inoperative parol agreements that add 
terms. Williston restates Restatement Section 239 as follows: "[a]n incom-
plete writing may be added to by parol. "74 In essence, Restatement Sec-
tion 239 is the second part of Professor Burton's parol evidence rule.75 
When examining Problem 1, a court could rely on the Restatement 
to support its consideration76 of AB's e-mails that DJ would not begin 
work until 10 p.m. More precisely, a court could rely on Restatement 
Section 239 to support its consideration of AB's e-mails if the written 
contract was final but incomplete-i.e., a "partial integration." 
72. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcrs § 228 (1932). See Proceedings of 1971 
Annual Meeting, 48 A.LI. PRoc. 446 (1971) (according to Professor Braucher, "I 
think there is a certain sorrow about the phrase 'integrated agreement' and if you had 
a better word, it could well be an improvement." Apparently, no one had a "better 
word."). 
73. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcrs § 228 cmt. a (1932). 
74. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 1830 (rev. ed. 1936). 
75. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
76. Cf Burnham, supra note 1 at 121 ("Law students always focus initially on this 
question, believing that ... the most important issue is whether the agreement was 
made."); id. (supporting that in considering AB's evidence of e-mails, the court would 
have to determine whether the e-mails establish whether an agreement was made as 
to starting time). 
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Restatement Section 229, entitled "Partial Integration," expressly 
acknowledges the possibility that "[p ]art of the terms of an agreement 
may be integrated"; but it does not explain how courts are to determine 
whether a writing is only a partial integration.77 Under the Restatement, 
courts are to look only to the writing itself to determine whether it is a 
partial integration.78 Williston's treatise provides the following justifica-
tion for this "four corners"79 approach: "[I]f the court may seek this inten-
tion from extrinsic circumstances, the very fact that the parties made a 
contemporaneous oral agreement will of itself prove that they did not 
intend the writing to be a complete memorial."80 
Section 240(b) provides an alternative ground for a court's consider-
ation of additional terms as parol evidence-if "the agreement is not in-
consistent with the integrated contract, and ... is such an agreement as 
might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as 
were the parties to the written contract." A determination of "natural-
ness" would seem even more difficult than a determination of whether 
77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 229 (1932). 
78. See Universal Major Elec. Appliances v. Glenwood Range Co., 223 F.2d 76, 
78 (4th Cir. 1955) ("[O]nly a partial integration of the contract since it ... showed of 
itself that something was needed to complete the agreement. See Restatement of Con-
tracts, § 229."). 
79. See Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Paro[ Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The 
Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 35, 45 (1985) (Supporting that neither the 
Restatement nor Williston used the term "four corners." Others have so described 
this approach to determining whether an agreement is a partial integration.) ("Willis-
ton's test for determining whether an integration is total or partial is a liberalization 
of the "four corners" test because, under Williston's test, facial completeness of the 
writing does not necessarily result in finding a total integration. Under Williston's 
highly influential test, adopted by the Restatement of Contracts (First Restate-
ment)"); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using 
"Knowing Assent" as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 469, 534 (2008) ("Williston ... took the view 
that the question of integration could be resolved by looking within the 'four corners' 
of the writing."); Daniel, supra note 25, at 243 ("'four corners' approach as adopted 
by Professor Samuel Williston"). But see JosEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PE-
RILLO ON CONTRACTS 113 (6th ed. 2009). 
80. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1820. See also Movsesian, supra note 61, at 267, 
268 ("Williston's penchant for abbreviated policy arguments-his tendency to de-
scribe the effect of legal rules in intuitive terms-can strike a contemporary academic 
reader as unsophisticated, even banal. ... Today most legal scholars think of them-
selves as writing primarily for other academics .... Williston understands the enter-
prise of legal scholarship quite differently .... Williston believes that his most 
important task as a scholar consists of creating a doctrinal system that attorneys and 
business people can use on an everyday basis, one that simplifies the law and makes it 
more comprehensible."). 
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the written contract is a "partial integration."81 The most helpful word in 
Section 240(b) is "might." It is much easier to meet a "might be in a 
separate agreement" test than to meet a "would be in a separate agree-
ment" test. As Comment (d) to Restatement Section 240 explains, "[i]t is 
not essential that the particular provision would always or even usually be 
made in a separate collateral agreement. It is enough that making such a 
provision in that way is not so exceptional as to be odd or unnatural." 
One of the illustrations of an agreement that might "naturally be made" 
without inclusion in an integrated contract involves time of perform-
ance,82 i.e., our Problem 1. 
The Restatement provides a two-part "justification" for the "Parol 
Evidence Rule" in a Comment to Section 240:83 (1) most written contracts 
set out everything that was included in the bargain, and (2) certainty is 
attained by making a general rule that the written contract does set out 
everything that was included in the bargain.84 Recall that certainty was 
one of the basic goals of the American Law Institute in promulgating the 
Restatements.85 Note that Williston's work has been generally described 
as a "shrine to certainty."86 
B. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Supplementation 
In Problem 1, DJ's evidence about customary starting times is ex-
trinsic evidence. The Restatement neither uses the term "parol evidence," 
nor the term "extrinsic evidence." The Restatement does, however, in a 
81. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79 at 47-48 ("Not surprisingly, the courts have 
not found the 'naturalness' test helpful in this context. ... [M]ost cases that admit 
proof of the oral agreement resort to the 'incomplete on its face' approach."). But cf 
Phipps v. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank, 34 P.2d 561, 563 (Kan. 1934); Markoff v. 
Kreiner, 23 A.2d 19, 24 (Md. 1941). 
82. See infra note 86. 
83. Section 237, comment a, of the Restatement provides "this Section states what 
is known as the parol evidence rule" but does not provide a justification for the parol 
evidence. RESTATEMENT (F1RST) OF CONTRACTS§ 237 cmt. a (1932). Comment d to 
§ 240 is the only place the Restatement addresses justification, and the only place the 
Restatement capitalizes the Paro! Evidence Rule. RESTATEMENT (F1RST) OF CON-
TRACTS § 240 cmt. d (1932). 
84. RESTATEMENT (F1RsT) OF CONTRACTS§ 240 cmt. d (1932). 
85. See 1 A.LI. PROC. 7-8 (1923), supra note 56; Frank, supra note 56, at 617. But 
cf Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the 
American Law Institute-The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L.REv. 1, 13-14. 
86. Anthony J. Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 36 Mo. L. REV. 270, 272 (1976-1977) 
(reviewing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) describing Willis-
ton's work as a "shrine to certainty"). See also Allen D. Boyer, Samuel Williston's 
Struggle With Depression, 42 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1994) ("Williston held up simplicity 
and certainty as intrinsic values toward which the law should aspire."). 
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topic separate from the Paro! Evidence Rule, utilize the term "usage," 
which as that term is defined in Restatement Section 24587 includes DJ's 
evidence about usual starting times. The general rule under Restatement 
Section 246(b) is that courts can look to usage to add terms to a written 
contract.88 This general rule is limited by the somewhat cryptic phrase 
"not inconsistent with the agreement or manifestations of intention."89 
Since there was nothing in the written agreement in Problem 1 as to time 
of performance, DJ's extrinsic evidence of when janitorial work customa-
rily begins is not "inconsistent with the agreement." What about Restate-
ment Section 246(b) 's other limiting phrase "manifestations of 
intention"? The Comment to Restatement Section 246(b) explains "[t]he 
test ... is the practical one, whether a reasonable contracting party might 
enter into the written contract in question and have intended to be bound 
by both its express terms, and also by the terms of the usage or collateral 
parol agreement in question."90 
Restatement Section 246 then sets forth four Illustrations of Clause 
(b ). In each instance, usage became a part of the contract. Similarly, in 
the four reported cases that expressly considered Section 246's "not in-
consistent with the ... manifestations of intention" limitation, the courts 
included usage as a term of the contract, relying primarily on one or more 
of the illustrations.9I Section 246's Illustration 10 which deals with a trade 
usage as to time performance when the contract is silent as to time of 
performance, seems indistinguishable from Problem 1: 
A contracts to sell and B to buy a hundred barrels of flour at $8 a 
barrel. By an operative usage in contracts for the sale of flour 
where the contract fixes no time for the payment of the price, pay-
ment is regarded as due ten days after delivery. The meaning of 
B's promise is a promise to pay the price ten days after delivery of 
the flour. 
87. "Usage is habitual or customary practice." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CON-
TRACTS § 245 (1932). 
88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 246(b) (1932) ("Operative usages 
have the effect of ... adding to the agreement ... not inconsistent with the agreement 
or manifestations of intention."). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at cmt. b. 
91. Certain cases invoke Section 246 to exclude evidence of custom that was con-
trary to the agreement. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Good Hope Refineries, Inc., 604 F.2d 
865, 875 (5th Cir. 1979); Distillers Distrib Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 
800, 804 (4th Cir. 1950); State ex rel Porter Co. v. Nangle, 405 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1966); Hopper v. Lennen & Mitchell, 52 F.Supp. 319, 324 (S.D. Cal. 1943); 
Heiden v. General Motors Corp., 567 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
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Therefore, when applying Restatement Section 246 to Problem 1, a court 
could consider DJ's extrinsic evidence of when janitorial work customa-
rily begins to determine DJ's starting time. 
C. Resolving Inconsistent Paro[ Evidence and Extrinsic Evidence 
During Contract Supplementation 
Problem 1, unlike Section 246's Illustration 10 above, involves both 
parol evidence (AB and DJ's agreement) and extrinsic evidence (trade 
custom) that are in conflict with each other. This then raises the question 
of how to resolve this conflict. Comment (b) of Section 246 suggests that 
greater weight be given to extrinsic evidence: "Concrete cases seem to 
indicate that reasonable persons are much more likely to rely on a recog-
nized usage to affect the otherwise natural implications of their written 
contracts than on collateral parol agreements."92 However, this language 
in Comment (b) to Restatement Section 246 is inconsistent with Illustra-
tion 4 of Section 240: 
A and B in an integrated contract respectively promise to sell and 
to buy specified goods. No time or place for delivery is specified. 
If no agreement is made as to these matters the rule of law is that 
the goods are deliverable in a reasonable time at the seller's place 
of business. A contemporaneous oral agreement that the goods 
shall be delivered within thirty days, at the buyer's place of busi-
ness, is operative. 
Williston's treatise, published only a few years after the Restatement, 
supports the result in Illustration 4. According to Williston, where no 
time for performance is fixed in a written contract, the law fixes the time 
in accordance with certain rules irrespective of what the parties actually 
intended. Williston writes "'[W]hen an ordinary contract does not state 
the time for performance, and the parties orally agree on a particular 
time,' the legal implication that they intended a reasonable time is an 
implication 'fictitiously invented by the law."'93 Williston's use of the 
phrase "and the parties orally agree" assumes away too many litigable 
issues. Often, as in Problem 1, one party will contend either that there 
92. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) Qp CONTRACTS§ 246 cmt. b (1932). 
93. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcrs § 640, at 1840 
(3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1963). Professor Hadjiyannakis explains that the Restatement and 
Williston regard custom and usage as implied in law and the terms of a written con-
tract as implied in fact and "(a]ccording to Williston and the First Restatement, parol 
evidence is admissible to contradict implications of law but it may not be used to 
contradict the implied in fact terms of the writing." Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at 
55-56. 
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was never an oral agreement as to time of performance, or that if there 
was such an agreement by later entering into a written contract that was 
silent as to time of performance, the parties intended to discharge the 
earlier oral agreement as to time of performance.94 
When there is a conflict between parol evidence and extrinsic evi-
dence, a court would be required to answer two different questions: (1) is 
the parol evidence admissible and if so, (2) which should control: parol 
evidence or extrinsic evidence. Under the Restatement, parol evidence is 
admissible under Section 239 if the writing is a partial integration, or 
under Section 240 if the oral agreement meets the "naturalness" test. The 
Restatement's standards for answering the second question are less clear. 
At best, language found in a comment and in an illustration support con-
flicting arguments. 
D. Paro/ Evidence and Contract Interpretation 
Problem 2 involves contract interpretation-the meaning of the 
term "daily" in the written agreement is an issue that should be resolved. 
As noted earlier, the Restatement chapter entitled "The Scope and 
Meaning of Contracts" is divided into three separate topics: "Topic 1. In-
terpretation," Topic 2. Parol Evidence Rule," and "Topic 3. Usage." The 
Restatement's separation of the parol evidence rule from contract inter-
pretation was based on Williston's belief that the parol evidence rule "is 
not a rule of interpretation or construction. It is a rule of substantive law 
which, when applicable, defines the limit of a contract. It fixes the subject 
matter for interpretation though not itself a rule of interpretation. "95 In 
contrast, under the Restatement, the parol evidence rule will not pre-
clude a court's consideration of parol evidence when the question is one 
of contract interpretation. Under the Restatement, the parol evidence 
rule precludes consideration of parol evidence in the form of agreements 
between the parties only when the question is one of adding new terms to 
a written contract, and not one of interpreting terms already in the 
writing.96 
94. Cf Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at 46 ("An alleged agreement fixing the 
time for performance is such an integral part of the transaction that if the agreement 
were intended to be a part of the contract, one might ordinarily have expected the 
parties to have included it in the writing."). 
95. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1813. 
96. RESTATEMENT (F1RsT) OF CONTRACTS§ 237 cmt. a (1932) ("Nor is it [the 
parol evidence rule] a rule of interpretation."). 
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When does interpretation end and supplementation begin?97 Inter-
pretation is limited to giving meaning to actual words in a contract whose 
meaning is unclear or ambiguous.98 Obviously there will be some99 situa-
tions in which it is not obvious whether evidence is being offered to add a 
term to a written contract, or to give meaning to a term that is already in 
the writing. 
Consider, for example, the "Chicken Case,"100 Frigaliment,101 which 
is a classic case in a typical first year Contracts law course. There, the 
buyer sued for breach of a "sale of goods" contract that described the 
goods to be sold as "U.S. Fresh Frozen Chicken."102 The seller delivered 
boiling hens. The buyer contended that the contract required the delivery 
of young chickens suitable for broiling and frying. Judge Friendly103 con-
cluded that the issue was one of contract interpretation-"what is 
chicken?"104 Alternatively, Judge Friendly could have concluded that the 
issue in Frigaliment was one of contract addition-can parol evidence105 
or extrinsic evidence106 add the term "young" or the term "suitable for 
97. C.R. Anthony Company v. Loretto Mall Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, <J116, 112 
N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 ("The operative question then becomes whether the evidence 
is offered to contradict the writing or aid in its interpretation. We leave these distinc-
tions to case-by-case development by our lower courts."). 
98. E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 
962-63 (1967). See also STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETA· 
TION 120-22 (2009). 
99. And "some" law professors would substitute the word "most" or the word 
"all" for "some." See CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, supra note 79, at 129 
("The very same words that are offered as an additional term that are rejected be-
cause the court deems the writing to be a complete integration can be offered as an 
aid to interpretation of a written term."). 
100. See (yes, actually see) R.B. Craswell, Chicken in a Contract (Frigaliment Im-
porting Co. v BNS International Sales), YouTusE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=ELwt-KXz8GA. 
101. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
102. Id. at 117. 
103. The Frigaliment case was heard by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York shortly after Judge Friendly's appointment to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to his appointment, 
Judge Friendly had been a founding partner of Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Cox. 
While he had participated in numerous appeals, his trial court experience was very 
limited. And so, he volunteered to sit as a district court judge in the Frigaliment case. 
See DAVID M. DoRSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF Hts ERA 60, 81, 315 
(2012). 
104. Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F.Supp. at 117. 
105. Id. at 118. 
106. Id. at 119. 
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broiling for frying" to the written contract? 107 Problem 2 is unlike Frigali-
ment. In Problem 2, it is clear that parol evidence and extrinsic evidence 
is not being offered to add a term to the written contract which contains 
the term "daily." The argument is whether the word "daily" is or is not 
"ambiguous." 
The word "ambiguous" is a critical part of Restatement Section 230 
which is entitled "Standard of Interpretation Where There is Integra-
tion." Section 230 provides: 
The standard of interpretation of an integration, except where it 
produces an ambiguous result, ... is the meaning that would be 
attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person ac-
quainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circum-
stances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the 
integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what they 
intended it to mean.108 
Subject to its "ambiguous" exception,109 the standard for interpretation in 
Restatement Section 230 is an objective one-"the meaning that would 
be attached ... by a reasonably intelligent person." Therefore, Section 
230's test for determining whether a term is ambiguous is an objective 
one.110 As Professor Perillo explains: 
For Williston the contract acquires a life and meaning of its own, 
separate and apart from the meaning the parties attach to their 
agreement. It is not primarily the intention of the parties which 
the court is seeking, but the meaning of the words at the time and 
place when they were used. He is explicit in stating why this 
should be so. A facility and certa,inty of interpretation is obtained, 
107. Cf Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for 
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1829, 1857 n.61 (2004) (explaining an alter-
nate legal principle under which to settle Frigaliment) ("Indeed, a year after issuing 
the Frigaliment Importing decision, Judge Henry Friendly admitted that the case 
might better have been decided on substantive assent grounds." (citing Dadourain 
Exp. Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d 178, 187 n.4 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting))). 
108. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 230 (1932) (emphasis added). 
109. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 230 cmt. a (1932) (explaining that both the first sentence of 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 230 and the first sentence of RESTATEMENT 
(FrnsT) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. a thereto use the article "the" before the word 
"standard" indicating the authors contemplated a single, fixed approach to contract 
interpretation). 
110. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 cmt. a (1932) ("The objective 
viewpoint of a third person is taken."). 
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which, though not ideal, is so much greater than is obtainable by 
use of a less rigid standard. The certainty so obtained is more than 
adequate compensation for the slight restriction put upon the 
power to grant and contract.111 
Whether the court can consider what the parties said about the meaning 
of the word "daily" in the written contract in Problem 2 would tum on 
whether the word "daily" is unclear or ambiguous to a reasonable per-
son.112 Section 230 expressly provides that "oral statements of the parties" 
cannot be considered when determining whether the words in a contact 
are ambiguous. 
In Problem 2, AB 's parol evidence is something other than an oral 
statement. E-mails are not "oral statements by the parties" but are still 
parol evidence as that term is used in this article, and in general, by 
courts.113 Neither the language of Restatement Section 230 nor the com-
ments thereto expressly preclude a court from considering earlier writings 
of the parties in interpreting words found in their final writing. Section 
230 bars only "oral statements by the parties as to what they intended it 
to mean." Nonetheless, the underlying objective policy as explained by 
Williston would seem equally applicable to exclude parol evidence in the 
form of e-mails when determining whether the word "daily" in Problem 2 
was ambiguous. 
111. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 132 (6th ed. 
2009) (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted). See also RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 230 cmt. b (1932) ("They have assented to the writing as the 
expression of the things to which they agree, therefore the terms of the writing are 
conclusive, and a contract may have a meaning different from that which either party 
supposed it to have."). 
112. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 238 cmt. a (1932) ("Such statements 
are also admissible ... if there is an ambiguity, but not otherwise."). See also RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 238 illus. 1 (1932); Farnsworth, supra note 98, at 
959 ("Under the older and more restrictive [view], parol evidence may only be used 
for the purpose of interpretation where the language in the writing is 'ambiguous' .... 
This is the view adopted both by Williston and the Restatement of Contracts."). 
113. E.g., Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., No. 01-09-00728-CV, 2012 WL 
1416558, at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2013) ("whether they were oral or written"); Mat-
thew v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Wis. 1972) ("[T)he parol 
evidence rule precludes the introduction into evidence of any contemporaneous or 
prior agreements, written or oral. .. -"); Sullivan v. United States, 244 F.Supp. 605, 
617 (W.D. Mo. 1965) ("[M)anifest obligations provided thereby are not affected by 
parol evidence of subjective intentions, inconsistent discussions, oral understandings, 
and negotiations leading up to its execution."). 
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E. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Interpretation 
In Problem 2, a court that follows the Restatement could consider 
the extrinsic evidence of trade usage to determine the meaning of the 
word "daily." The "reasonably intelligent person" who interprets terms of 
a contract per Section 230 is a person "acquainted with all operative us-
ages."II4 Thus, DJ's evidence of trade usage can be used to interpret the 
word "daily" regardless of whether there is an ambiguity.II5 Why does the 
Restatement discriminate between evidence of usage and evidence of 
oral statements when interpreting the words of a contract? One possible 
answer is that the former offers greater certainty of proof-there is a 
greater certainty that the use of "daily" in janitorial services contracts 
means Monday through Friday-and not seven days a week as suggested 
by AB and DJ's agreement. 116 A stronger argument is that the Restate-
ment takes an objective approach to contract interpretation, and trade 
usage, unlike statements of the parties, is objective in nature.II? Trade us-
age comes from the practices of disinterested, reasonable persons.118 We 
will next examine the Restatement Second's treatment of the issues 
raised by our two problems. 
114. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932). See also WILLISTON, 
supra note 74, at 1748 ("[C]ontracts apparently clear in their meaning may be shown 
by usage or the surrounding circumstances to be ambiguous .... "). 
115. See RESTATEMENT (F1RsT) OF CONTRACTS§§ 235(a)-(b) (1932); see also W1L-
usTON, supra note 74, at 1748 ("[C]ontracts apparently clear in their meaning may be 
shown by usage or the surrounding circumstances to be ambiguous or perhaps clearly 
to mean something different from the normal or ordinary meaning of their lan-
guage."). Compare RESTATEMENT (F1RST) OF CONTRACTS§ 230 illus. 2 (1932), with 
Problem 2, supra Section I. 
116. WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 1745 ("[A] reasonable degree of certainty is at-
tained if words are interpreted according to a standard not peculiar to the parties, but 
customary among persons of their kind under the existing circumstances."). See also 
Posner, supra note 48, at 559 ("Because admission of extrinsic evidence regarding 
course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage is less likely than admission 
of other forms of extrinsic evidence to result in judicial error, a more permissive 
stance toward the former is justified."). 
117. BuRTON, supra note 3, at 176 ("Trade usages and customs are objective 
elements."). 
118. Cf AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Associates, Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 
1995) ("By 'objective' evidence we mean evidence of ambiguity that can be supplied 
by disinterested third parties: evidence that there was more than one ship called 
Peerless . ... "). 
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IV. RESTATEMENT SECOND 
In 1952, th(;! ALI received a US$500,000 grant to underwrite the 
costs of reexamining and revising the Restatements. 119 At the ALi's 30th 
meeting in 1953, this project was announced as "Restatement Contin-
ued," starting with the Restatements of Agency, Conflict of Law, and 
Trusts.120 By the time the ALi's reexamination and revision of the Re-
statement of Contracts began in 1962, the name of the project had been 
changed to Restatement Second. Professor Robert Braucher121 of 
Harvard was named as the Reporter, and Professor Arthur Corbin en-
gaged to work as "Consultant." In 1964, Professor Corbin provided the 
following description of his work as a Consultant: 
I at once proceeded to prepare a 'one-man revision' of the entire 
Restatement. ... I worked steadily on this for about 18 months, 
covering the black letter sections, the comment[s] and illustra-
tions. Many sections I rewrote entirely, especially Chapter 9 on 
Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule .... Thus far, the Re-
porter has made steady use of my revision, although [he is] in no 
respect bound to follow it.122 
Understandably, contracts scholars have searched for a copy of Corbin's 
revision notes. Surprisingly, no law library has been able to find a copy, 
and the ALi's copy has apparently disappeared.123 
In writing about the parol evidence provisions of the Restatement 
Second, Dean John Murray concludes "the Restatement (Second) is 
119. Minturn T. Wright III, The American Law Institute - Thirtieth Annual Meet-
ing, 39 AB.A. J. 580, 581 (1953). 
120. What a meeting that must have been! A panel discussion of government inves-
tigation of communist activity featuring Abe Fortas and Bruce Bromley and "a con-
cert which included Judge Learned Hand's recent recording of two folk songs and 
several renditions by Judge Augustus Hand in person." Id. See Judge Billings Learned 
Hand Singing Old English Song, YouTuBE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=oJpblG8ctrU (you can hear Judge Learned Hand on YouTube). 
121. See generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Preface: Robert Braucher and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 631, 631-32 (1982). 
122. Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L.J. 
311, 322 n.22 (1964). 
123. See Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of Arthur Lin-
ton Corbin, 53 S.C. L. REv. 605 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters From Arthur 
L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755, 755 (1993). 
Spring 2014) THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 75 
clearly influenced by the criticisms of Professor Corbin"124-influenced, 
but not controlled. According to Professor Braucher: 
Professor Corbin went through all of this material, before I 
started to work on it and made rather copious notes .... I had 
started with the original formulation in the First Restatement, and 
with Professor Corbin's notes which left very little of the parol 
evidence rule, and took, I think a ground that went somewhat 
short of what Professor Corbin would have liked.125 
Professor Braucher's work as Reporter ended in 1971 when he was ap-
pointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of the Columbia University School 
of Law succeeded Professor Robert Braucher as Reporter. 126 Work on the 
Restatement Second (Contracts) was largely completed during 
Braucher's term as Reporter. 127 The ALI completed the Restatement Sec-
ond in 1979. The Restatement Second was published in 1981. 
Unlike the Restatement, the Restatement Second reflects the work 
of more than just one man. The Restatement Second was influenced not 
only by the work of Professors Williston, Corbin, Braucher, and Farns-
worth, but also by the work of many other men and women that included 
the ALI Council, 128 the advisers appointed by the ALI Council, and ALI 
members who participated in the fourteen ALI annual meetings at which 
124. John E. Murray, Jr., The Paro/ Evidence Process and Standardized Agree-
ments Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342, 1350 
(1975). 
125. Proceedings of 1971 Annual Meeting, 48 AL.I. PROC. 442 (1971). 
126. See generally Jean Braucher, E. Allan Farnsworth and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 1420, 1421 (2005). 
127. Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of 
Contracts, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 13, 13 (1981). 
128. The AB! certificate of incorporation provides that the ALi's managers shall 
be called "councilors." Certificate of Incorporation, ALI.ORG, (Jan. 17, 2013), http:// 
www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.charter. Professor Farnsworth describes the 
work of the Council on the Restatement Second as follows: "The draft containing 
revisions prompted by the Advisers, would be challenged anew when it was brought 
before the Council, usually in December. The Council, some fifty to sixty eminent 
lawyers, judges, and teachers of law, read the draft as generalists rather than special-
ists .... [T]he Council's decisions ... were binding on the Reporter." E. Allan Farns-
worth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 
Co LUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981 ). Judge Richard Posner has criticized the lack of age diver-
sity on the Council. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LE-
GAL THEORY 307 (1999) ("[T]he Institute should consider putting a term limit on 
membership in the Council."). 
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the Restatement Second was discussed.129 The work of these men and wo-
men 130 on the Restatement Second also took into account case law and 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 131 In 1967, Professor Herbert Wechsler 
proposed what has become the ALI's working formula for balancing con-
siderations of what the law is with what the law should be: "We should 
feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to all of the considerations 
that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial function, deem it right 
to weigh in theirs. "132 
The Restatement Second differs from the Restatement not only in. 
the preparation process but also in the nature of the final product. The 
Restatement Second includes longer comments, more illustrations, and a 
new feature, Reporter's Note, which includes citations to cases and com-
mentary. In a five page article that summarized the Restatement Second's 
treatment of parol evidence and usage, Professor Braucher wrote 
"Changes in style and terminology have been freely made in the interest 
of clarity and consistency; substantive changes have not been limited to 
developments since the original Restatement; comments have been 
expanded. "133 
The Restatement Second is similar to the Restatement in many re-
spects: it distinguishes parol evidence from usage, and questions of con-
tract supplementation from questions of contact interpretation; it uses the 
term "parol evidence rule" in the title of section but not in the text, and 
treats "usage" in a separate topic from the parol evidence rule; it makes 
clear that the parol evidence rule is not "a rule of interpretation; it de-
fines the subject matter of interpretation";134 and it treats the role of us-
age in supplementing an agreement and the role of usage in interpreting 
an agreement in separate sections.135 With this background, let's revisit 
Problem 1 (our problem on contract supplementation) and then Problem 
2 (our problem on contract interpretation). 
129. See Jean Braucher, supra note 126, at 1422-24. 
130. Justice Ellen Peters, Associate Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court (for-
merly a Yale Law professor) was an adviser for the American Law Institute, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT'S. Ronald K.L. Collins, Gilmore's Grant (or the 
Life & Afterlife of Grant Gilmore & His Death), 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 7, 22 n.103 (1995). 
131. Jean Braucher, supra note 126, at 1424-25. 
132. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 
(1969). 
133. Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 13. 
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213 cmt. a (1981). 
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 220, 221 (1981). 
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A. Paro! Evidence and Contract Supplementation 
Recall that in Problem 1, AB wants the court to consider evidence 
of a parol agreement to add a time of performance term to a final written 
contract. Using language that is clearer than the relevant Restatement 
provisions, Restatement Second Section 216(a) provides that AB's evi-
dence of a parol agreement "is admissible to supplement" unless the writ-
ten contract for janitorial services was "completely integrated." Thus, 
under the Restatement Second, like the Restatement, the court's consid-
eration of AB's evidence of a parol agreement in Problem 1 would turn 
on whether the final written contract was completely integrated. The two 
significant changes effected by the Restatement Second's parol evidence 
provisions are: (1) whether an agreement is completely integrated is a 
question "preliminary" to the application of the parol evidence rule to be 
decided by the court,136 and (2) in deciding this preliminary question of 
whether the agreement is completely integrated, the court can consider 
parol evidence.137 
Professor Braucher explained the changes at the 1970 Annual Meet-
ing of the American Law Institute: 
We have also added something which was not, I believe, in the 
original Restatement, which is that this [the question of whether 
there is a complete integration] is a question for the court. ... 
. . . The parol evidence rule is primarily a device to control jury 
findings, dispensing power, and assist findings of fact. The safe-
guard here is that this is done by the judge as a preliminary ques-
tion, and the determination whether there has been an integrated 
agreement, and, if so, whether it's complete or partial, is to be 
made in the light of the entire context. 138 
Thus, under Restatement Second Section 214, in contrast to the Restate-
ment, AB's parol evidence of an additional term can be considered by the 
court for the limited purpose of determining whether the agreement is 
completely integrated.139 The Restatement Second (or at least its Re-
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 210 (3) (1981). 
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (b). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 210 cmt. c (1981). 
138. Proceedings of 1970 Annual Meeting, 47 A.LI. PROC. 536-37 (1970). 
139. "[T]he difficulties arise in determining whether ... it is completely or only 
partially integrated .... Those determinations are made in accordance with all rele-
vant evidence, and require interpretation both of the integrated agreement and of the 
prior agreement." Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 17. Perhaps this is an example 
of what Professor Braucher had in mind with the statement "not limited to develop-
ments since the original Restatement." Id. at 13. 
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porter) abandons the Restatement's four corners approach to determine 
whether there has been a complete integration: "Now, you will still find 
some cases where the court says that you look just at the document, its 
four corners, but I don't believe there is any court that can actually live 
with that. The document does not prove itself."140 It would seem that in 
hearing AB's evidence that there was an oral agreement about the time 
of performance, the court would be more likely to conclude that a written 
agreement silent as to time of performance was not a complete integra-
tion, unless the court chose to disbelieve AB's evidence. 
We need to use the "weasel word" "seem."141 We can only specu-
late142 as to whether the Restatement Second effects a significant change 
because no appellate court has expressly· considered whether parol evi-
dence as to an additional term, conclusively establishes that the writing 
was not a complete integration. While conducting a search using "all 
cases" in Westlaw's database, we only found one case that even cites to 
Restatement Second Section 214(b).143 
B . . Usage and Contract Supplementation 
To supplement the janitorial service contract in Problem 1, DJ 
would want the court to determine when work begins using the extrinsic 
evidence of customary practice. Note that the use of parol evidence to 
supplement the terms of a writing turns on whether the writing is a com-
plete integration. In contrast, the use of other extrinsic evidence such as 
trade custom to supplement a writing does not turn on whether the writ-
ing is a complete integration. The Restatement Second, like the Restate-
ment, uses the term "usage," rather than "trade usage" or "custom and 
usage." Further, the Restatement Second's definition of "usage" is ex-
actly the same as the Restatement's definition of "usage."144 The Restate-
140. Proceedings of 1970 Annual Meeting, 47 A.LI. PROC. 537 (1970). 
141. Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning, 2011 
BYU L. REv. 657, 661 (2011) ("Friedrich von Hayek pointed out the perversion of 
language in what he referred to as 'weasel words,' a phrase inspired by an old Norse 
myth that attributes to the weasel an ability to suck out the contents of an egg without 
breaking its shell. Hayek noted the possibility of emptying words of their content, or 
of stripping them of their meaning, so that only the signifier remains."). 
142. Professor Williston similarly speculated. See WILLISTON, supra note 74, at 
1820. 
143. In re Sabertooth, LLC, 443 B.R. 671, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011). 
144. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 (1981), with RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 245 (1981). Restatement Second adds a sec-
tion on "course of dealing" and treats "course of dealing" essentially the same as 
"usage." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981). 
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ment Second adds definitions of "usage of trade"145 and "course of 
dealing,"146 but "usage" is the operative term in the Restatement Second's 
provision that governs whether usage can add a term to a written con-
tract.147 Under the Restatement Second, as under the Restatement, 
neither the section on usage that supplements an agreement148 nor the 
illustrations thereunder make any mention of "complete integration." 
Like Illustration 10 to Restatement Section 246, Illustration 7 to Restate-
ment Second Section 222 seems indistinguishable from Problem 1: "A 
contracts to employ B for twenty days. In the kind of work to which the 
employment relates, in the place where both reside and the work is to be 
performed, a day's work is eight hours. Unless otherwise agreed, B's em-
ployment is for twenty, eight-hour days." 149 Therefore, in Problem 1, the 
court could determine that work begins at 8 a.m. 
Judge Braucher sees little difference between the Restatement and 
Restatement Second with respect to use of usage to supplement a final 
written contract. He summarizes the Restatement Second provisions on 
"usage" as "reorganized and rephrased, but follows the original Restate-
ment in substance."150 The differences between the Restatement Second 
and Restatement provisions on contract interpretation are more signifi-
cant as described below. 
C. Paro/ Evidence and Contract Interpretation 
Restatement Second Section 212 replaces Restatement Section 230. 
Under Restatement Second Section 212, "all relevant evidence including 
parol evidence is admissible on the issue of interpretation."151 Unlike Re-
statement Section 230, Restatement Second Section 212 does not ex-
pressly require a finding of ambiguity before a court can consider "oral 
statements by the parties of what they intended." 152 Unlike Restatement 
Section 230, Restatement Second, Section 212 ~oes not "take the objec-
tive viewpoint of a third person." Rather the focus of Restatement Sec-
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 222 (1981). 
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 223 (1981). 
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 222 cmt. a (1981) and RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 223 cmt. a (1981) provide "[t]his Section ... states 
a particular application of the rules stated in section 220 [Usage Relevant to Interpre-
tation] and Section 221 [Usage Supplementing An Agreement]." 
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 221 (1981). 
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 222, cmt. c, illus. 7 (1981). 
150. Robert Braucher, supra note 127, at 17 ("Topic 4, 'Scope as Affected by Us-
age,' is reorganized and rephrased, but follows the original RESTATEMENT in 
substance."). 
151. Hadjiyannakis, supra note 79, at 59. 
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 212 cmt. b (1981). 
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ond Section 212 is on the meanings given by the parties.153 The "no 
ambiguity requirement" and "look to what the parties intended" provi-
sions of Section 212 are supported by other provisions of the Restatement 
Second. 154 
For example, Section 214(c) provides that parol agreements can be 
considered to establish "the meaning of the writing,"155 and under Section 
201(1), a term in a written contract is to be given the meaning agreed to 
both parties; neither Section 201(1) nor Section 214 requires a finding of 
ambiguity. 
The illustrations provided in Restatement Second Section 212 are 
even more helpful. Consider Illustration 3: "A orally agrees with B, a 
stockholder, that in transactions between them 'abracadabra' shall mean 
X Company. A sends a written order to B to buy 100 shares of 'abraca-
dabra,' and B buys 100 shares of X Company. The parties are bound in 
accordance with the oral agreement." If a court applies Restatement Sec-
ond Section 212, it could consider evidence that the parties agreed that 
"abracadabra" means "X Company." It could then consider evidence in 
Problem 2, and conclude that AB and DJ agreed that "daily" meant 
every day. 
D. Extrinsic Evidence and Contract Interpretation 
Restatement (Second) Section 220 is entitled "Usage Relevant to 
Interpretation."156 Its only express limitation on a court's consideration of 
"usage" when interpreting the terms in a written contract, is the parties' 
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 212 cmt. a (1981) ("Interpretation 
of contracts deals with the meaning given to language and other conduct by the par-
ties .... "); see also Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Paro[ Evidence 
Rule and its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 
205 n.39 (1998) ("While the First Restatement excluded evidence of the parties' intent 
in favor of the judge's view of a reasonable third party, the Second Restatement .. . 
permits evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations to .. . 
explain the meaning of the writing."). But c.f Posner, supra note 48, at 570 ("Corbin's 
mistake is that, in assuming that the purpose of contract law is to enforce the inten-
tion of the parties, he overlooks the fact that the parties, in addition to their ordinary 
contractual intentions, have intentions about how courts should evaluate their con-
tract in case of a dispute."). 
154. And by case law and commentary. See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall 
Partners, 1991-NMSC-070, '1115, n.3, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (1991) ("We hold 
today that in determining whether a term ... is unclear, a court may hear evidence of 
... usage of trade ... [i]n this regard, we join with the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts .... "); BURTON, supra note 3, at 139 ("The best reading is that the Restate-
ment (Second) does not require a finding of ambiguity .... "). 
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) (1981). 
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 220 (1981). 
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"know[ing] or [having] reason to know" of the usage.157 As Comment ( d) 
explains, "[l]anguage and conduct are in general given meaning by usage 
... there is no requirement that an ambiguity be shown before usage can 
be shown, and no prohibition against showing that language ... [can] 
have a different meaning in light of usage from the meaning they might 
have apart from the usage."158 The Restatement (Second) contains an il-
lustration that is instructive to our Problem 2. The written contract pro-
vides: "A will buy and B will sell the rabbits at '60 £ per thousand.' The 
parties contract with reference to a local usage that 1,000 rabbits means 
100 dozen. The usage is a part of the contract." 159 If a court applies the 
Restatement (Second) to this illustration, it could look to usage and con-
clude that "l,000" means "1,200." Similarly, with respect to Problem 2, 
the same court could then look to usage and conclude that "daily" meant 
Monday through Friday. 
V. LEARNING FROM THE RESTATEMENT FIRST AND 
THE RESTATEMENT SECOND 
The application of the Restatement and the Restatement Second to 
our two problems highlights important differences in how these two 
sources of law treat parol evidence, extrinsic evidence, the parol evidence 
rule and contract interpretation. Law professors sometimes refer to the 
Restatement's provisions on parol evidence, extrinsic evidence, the parol 
evidence rule and contract interpretation as "objective,"160 and the com-
parable Restatement Second's provisions as "subjective."161 Other law 
professors have referred to the Restatement's provisions as Willistonian, 
and the Restatement Second's provisions as Corbinian. 162 Law professors 
seem to refer to these sections of the Restatement and Restatement Sec-
ond more than lawyers or judges which we think is regrettable. We urge 
157. Id. cmt. b. 
158. Id. cmt. d. 
159. Id. illus. 8. 
160. BURTON, supra note 3 at 26. 
161. See GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A NUT-
SHELL 73 (West Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1990); Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" 
Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract 
Law, 42 u. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 777 (2009). 
162. See B1x, supra note 52 at 61 ("Willistonian approach ... with the First Re-
statement ... Corbinian approach ... incorporated in the Second Restatement"); 
Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable From the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good 
Faith, 76 IowA L. REV. 503, 518-19 (1991) ("differences between the Willistonian 
(First Restatement) and Corbinian (Second Restatement) approaches to contract 
interpretation"). 
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courts to make greater use of the provisions and policies of the 
Restatement. 
As noted earlier, the questions raised by our two problems are ques-
tions that are regularly raised in reported cases. Too often in resolving 
these questions, courts base their decisions on the use and misuse of the 
terms "extrinsic evidence," "parol evidence," and the "parol evidence 
rule," rather than the relevant provisions and policies of the Restatement 
or the Restatement Second.163 Nonetheless, both the Restatement and the 
Restatement Second can be instructive to lawyers, judges, and law stu-
dents164 in confronting questions of contract supplementation or contract 
interpretation. Three165 important lessons can be drawn: 
The first lesson from the Restatements relates to different questions. 
Disputes between the parties to a final written contract over the meaning 
of a term in that contract raise questions that are different from those 
raised by disputes over the addition of a term to the final written con-
tract. In Problem 2, our hypothetical on contract interpretation, the 
threshold question is whether the word "daily" is ambiguous.166 Other 
questions that flow from the main question are: how does a court deter-
mine whether the term "daily" is "ambiguous," and if so, what does the 
term "daily" mean? 
Problem 1, our hypothetical on contract supplementation, raises dif-
ferent questions from that of Problem 2.167 When one party proffers evi-
dence that prior agreements of the parties included a term missing from 
163. For example, a December 30, 2012 Westlaw search of the "all cases" databases 
shows that 408 opinions mentioned the "parol evidence rule." Only 13 of the 408 
opinions even mentioned the RESTATEMENT or the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). 
164. See, e.g., Roberta Cooper Ramo, The President's Letter: A Farewell on the 
Horizon, 35 THE ALI REPORTER 1, 2 (2012) ("I met with an NYU law-school class of 
second- and third-year students .... When I asked how many of them used the Re-
statements ... everyone in the class raised a hand .... I think it is also a reflection of 
the need these days for law students to understand the law in more practical ways as 
they face a world that expects more immediate legal competence from new graduates. 
(Or, of course, they may have thought that part of their grade depended upon such an 
amiable result.)"). 
165. Remember the "rule of threes"? See WHAT 1s A TRICOLON?, supra note 5. 
166. Some would argue that this is not the threshold question because all words are 
ambiguous. Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles With Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 777 n.6 (1992) ("Every good poet knows ... [a]ll words, even those of just 
one meaning, are ambiguous, because all symbols depend on the uncertain designs of 
their makers and circumstances and the uncertain perceptions of both sayers and 
receivers."). 
167. Kniffin, supra note 30, at 92 ("When interpreting a contract, a court therefore 
has no reason to ask the set of questions designed to discover whether the parties 
intended to add a separate term to their contract, under the parol evidence rule."). 
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the final written contract, there is no threshold question of whether a 
term in the written contract is ambiguous. Indeed, the problem arises be-
cause there is no relevant term in the written contract. The threshold 
question in Problem 1 is whether the writing is the final and complete 
agreement between AB and DJ. If the writing is the final agreement, but 
not the complete agreement, and the evidence of the additional terms is 
an alleged earlier agreement, then other relevant questions arise. These 
include: (1) was there in fact such an earlier agreement? (2) did the final 
writing discharge the earlier agreement even though the two are not in-
consistent? and (3) would the court prefer to make that earlier agreement 
a part of the contract, or would it look to trade usage or fashion its own 
term, 168 or would it leave a gap in the contract? 
The questions triggered by the evidence of usage are different from 
the questions raised by the evidence of an earlier agreement. If in Prob-
lem 2, the writing is the final agreement but not the complete agreement, 
and the evidence of the additional term is an alleged custom, then the 
relevant questions include: (1) was there in fact such a custom? (2) did 
AB and DJ know or have reason to know of the custom? and (3) is mak-
ing that trade custom a term of the contract preferable to the court's fash-
ioning its own term or leaving a gap in that contract? 
The second lesson to be drawn from the Restatements is balancing 
text with context. The Restatement Second provides some different an-
swers to the above questions from those provided by Restatement. The 
answers under both sources, however, require a consideration and bal-
ancing of the relative importance of text and context. 169 The Restatement 
emphasizes text, giving greater weight to the written text when determin-
ing the threshold questions of whether the written contract is the com-
plete and final agreement of the parties, and whether a term in that 
written contract is ambiguous, while the Restatement Second looks more 
into context. Some law review articles provide policy arguments that 
favor a Restatement-like approach that gives greater weight to text. 170 
168. Posner, supra note 48, at 570 ("The parol evidence rule excludes extrinsic evi-
dence from consideration, while allowing the judge to rely on his or her personal 
knowledge, even though the former, more so than the latter, would enable the court 
to determine the parties' intentions."). 
169. The Chief Justice of the New Wales Supreme Court, J. Spigelman, recently 
compared the relative roles of text and context in contract interpretation in Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and United States. James 
Spigelman, Contractual Interpretation: A Comparative Perspective, 85 AusTRALIAN 
LAW JOURNAL 412 (2011). 
170. Linzer, supra note 2. See also William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and 
the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 
931, 947-53 (2001) (substituting "autonomy" and "efficiency" for text and context). 
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These arguments tend to use the words "certainty" and "efficiency" and 
"pragmatism."171 Other law review articles provide policy arguments that 
favor a Restatement Second-like approach that gives greater weight to 
context.172 These articles tend to use the words "fairness" and "accuracy" 
and "principled. "173 
Of more interest are the law review articles that favor different ap-
proaches for different kinds of contracts.174 For example, Professor Eric 
Posner argues that in "Ordinary Consumer Contracts," "[t]he court could 
sensibly admit extrinsic evidence that benefits buyers while excluding ex-
trinsic evidence that benefits sellers, on the ground that sellers can put 
relevant promises in writing more cheaply than buyers"175 while in "Com-
plex Business Contracts" "[b]ecause of the large number of statements 
made during preliminary negotiations, the number of statements outside 
the contact is likely to be high. As a result of the idiosyncrasy of the 
terms, erroneous judicial enforcement of some of these statements is 
likely."176 It is difficult to find an express consideration of these policy 
arguments in reported cases. Instead, courts far too often simply attribute 
rulings to the parol evidence rule or the plain meaning rule. 177 
171. In this context, "certainty" and "efficiency" and "pragmatism" are "buzz 
words" for the proposition that the more that arbitrators and judges involved in dis-
pute resolution refer to matters other than text, the less certain the outcome and the 
more expensive the process. See Linzer, supra note 2. See also Whitford, supra note 
170. 
172. Mooney, supra note 36. 
173. "Fairness" or "accuracy" or "principled" in this context values determining 
the actual intention of the actual parties. See Linzer, supra note 2, at 838. But cf 
Posner, supra note 48, at 570 ("[P]arties in addition in addition to their ordinary con-
tractual intentions have intentions about how courts should evaluate their contract in 
case of a dispute."). 
174. Professor Oman reminds us that the leading nineteenth century treatise on 
contracts was organized around types of contracts (e.g., contracts with parish officers, 
contracts for the purchase of real estate) rather than around general contract law 
concepts. Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEo. L. J. 77, 
80-81 (2009). See also Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not 
Under Seal, and Upon the Usual Defenses to Actions Theron (London, S. Sweet 1826). 
More recently, in 2012, the American Law Institute began work on a new restatement 
on contracts that will be limited to consumer contracts. Current Projects: Restatement 
Third, The Law of Consumer Contracts, ali.org, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseac-
tion=projects.proj_ip&projectid=25 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
175. Posner, supra note 48, at 554. 
176. Id. at 556. 
177. E.g., Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 496 F. App'x 551 (6th Cir. 2012) 
("According to the parol evidence rule, a court may not use extrinsic evidence to 
interpret contract language that is unambiguous."); Ruiz v. United States, 2012 WL 
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The third and final lesson calls for the use of clear and simple vocab-
ulary. The terms "parol evidence" and "extrinsic evidence" and "parol 
evidence rule" are neither essential nor helpful to answer questions about 
the terms of a written contract. These terms neither appear in the text of 
the Restatement nor in the text of the Restatement Second. Clear and 
simple language was a major objective of the American Law Institute. 178 
The Restatement Second's phrase "prior agreements" is more trans-
parent than the term "parol evidence." It is clear that "prior agreements" 
includes both oral agreements and written agreements and nothing else. 
Similarly, the Restatement and Restatement Second's use of the 
term "usage" avoids the confusion that results from the courts' use of the 
term "extrinsic evidence," or worse, "parol evidence." It is clear that "us-
age" does not include prior agreements of the parties, and therefore 
questions on whether usage fills a gap in a written contract or is helpful in 
giving meaning to words in a written contract should not be based on the 
parol evidence rule-a rule that is based on the proposition that a writing 
supplants earlier agreements of the parties. 
Finally, both the Restatement and the Restatement Second limit the 
use of the term "parol evidence rule" to a parenthetical in section head-
ings. Numerous professors have suggested that the parol evidence rule be 
renamed as "'contract supplementation' or 'contract variance' rule" 179 or 
"Prior Negotiation Rule" 180 or the "written contract exclusionary rule." 181 
As Shakespeare said, "[t]hat which we call a rose I By any other 
name would smell as sweet."182 To question the use of a single rule to 
124442 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ("Under the parol evidence rule a court ... does not look to 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms of an unambiguous written instrument."). 
178. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization 
for the Improvement of the Law, The American Law Institute 50th Anniversary 29 
(1973) (addressing "the importance of expressing the [R]estatement in clear and sim-
ple English, avoiding so far as possible, the use of technical and unusual terms[,]" and 
that "the [R]estatement should be understandable by an intelligent, educated person 
who is not a trained lawyer."). 
179. Kniffin, supra note 30, at 102. 
180. Burnham, supra note 1, at 97. 
181. Daniel, supra note 26, at 261. 
182. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act II, sc. ii. ("What's in a name? 
That which we call a rose I By any other name would smell as sweet."). The senior 
author opposed the use of this old saying as trite until it was pointed out that both 
Harvard and Columbia publications included it in 2012, albeit in "secondary" 
Harvard and Columbia journals. See Gary J. Simson, Religion By Any Other Name? 
Prohibitions on Same Sex Marriage and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 
CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132 (2012); Robin West, A Marriage ls a Marriage ls a 
Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REv. F. 47 (2012). And, even 
better, Nucky Thompson used it in the first season of Boardwalk Empire, Quotes: 
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answer the various issues raised by our two problems is more important 
than to question the name of the rule that resolves all issues raised by the 
parties who reduce an agreement to writing. The inquiry should focus on 
balancing the weight to be given to text with that to be given to context. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
From the beginning, the Restatements have been a blend of what 
the law is and what the law should be.183 The Restatement of Contracts' 
Chapter 9, "The Scope and Meaning of Contracts" is more a reflection of 
what the Reporter thought courts should be doing than what courts were 
actually doing in 1932. In substituting "Reporters" for "Reporter," the 
same is true of the corresponding provisions of the Restatement Second, 
and of actions of courts in 1981. The same is also true of courts today. 
Both the Restatement and the Restatement Second suggest that courts 
should answer questions about adding terms to written contracts or inter-
preting terms in a written contract by balancing the weight given to text 
with the weight given to context. The Restatement and the Restatement 
Second disagree on principled bases about where this balance should be 
drawn. 
Instead of the reasoned analysis suggested by the Restatement and 
the Restatement Second, courts too often use the terms "parol evidence," 
"extrinsic evidence," and the "parol evidence rule" to "explain" decisions 
and adopt an"[a]nalysis by epithet."184 A court's focus on labels rather 
than on reasoning not only impedes law students' understanding of what 
the law is and how to answer questions on an exam, but also lawyers' 
understanding of how to advise clients and how to present arguments to 
arbitrators and judges. While we do not recommend that courts choose 
Boardwalk Empire, tvtropes.org, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Quotes/ 
BoardwalkEmpire (January 18, 2013). 
183. Promissory estoppel and third-party beneficiary are probably the two most 
obvious examples of this mixture. See generally Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: 
The Legal History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425 (2007); 
Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Benefi-
ciary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
184. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 515 
(2001) ("(F]all back on vague labels such as 'aler ego' or 'lack of separation' which has 
been variously characterized as analysis by epithet and reasoning by perjorative."). 
Great phrase. Professor Bainbridge likes it so much that he used it again in three later 
articles. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, How Do Judges Maximize?, 51 EMORY L. J. 
83, 148 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 77, 98 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishop's Alter Ego: Enterprise Liabil-
ity and the Catholic Priest Sex Abuse Scandal, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 97 (2007). 
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the Restatement over the Restatement Second or vice versa, we argue 
that courts should increasingly look to the balancing of text and context 
that is common to both of these sources of law. 
